
















Indiana University  
 
 
May 24, 2010 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616801. 
 
The Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research resides in the Department of Economics 
at Indiana University Bloomington.  CAEPR can be found on the Internet at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~caepr. CAEPR can be reached via email at caepr@indiana.edu or 
via phone at 812-855-4050. 
 
©2008 by NAME. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may 
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to 





We develop a closed economy model in order to study the interactions among
sovereign risk premia, ﬁscal limits and ﬁscal policy. The stochastic ﬁscal limit, which
measures the ability and willingness of the government to service its debt, arises en-
dogenously from dynamic Laﬀer Curves. The distribution of ﬁscal limits is country-
speciﬁc, depending on the size of the government, the degree of the counter-cyclical
policy responses, economic diversity and political uncertainty, and, therefore, the model
can rationalize diﬀerent sovereign ratings across developed countries. The model also
produces a nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of gov-
ernment debt. The nonlinearity is consistent with the empirical evidence that once risk
premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. The default risk premia of long-term bonds
jump ahead of short-term bonds and provide early warnings of sovereign defaults.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E62; H30; H60
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As a result of the deterioration of public ﬁnances in tandem with mounting economic pressure
from the ﬁnancial crisis, rating agencies downgraded the sovereign debt in several OECD
countries in 2009 and 2010. Portugal and Spain were downgraded by one notch, while
Ireland and Greece were downgraded by two notches. The spread between the 10-year Greek
government bond and equivalent German bond widened to more than 300 basis points in
March 2010. Contrary to conventional wisdom, developed countries are frequently penalized
when the ﬁnancial market raises concerns about the risk of government debts, even though
these countries have not defaulted on their sovereign debt in the post-war period. Figure
1 depicts the sovereign downgrades of OECD countries since 1975. In addition, diﬀerent
countries are usually downgraded at diﬀerent levels of debt. Figure 2 compares six countries
in three groups, New Zealand and Canada, Italy and Belgium, and Sweden and Japan. For
instance, the debt rating of the government of New Zealand was reduced by three notches
from AAA to AA- as its gross debt climbed from 58% to 75% of its GDP. The Canadian
government, on the other hand, was able to keep its AAA rating until its debt hit 90% of its
GDP. These evidences indicate that the joint analysis of sovereign default risk premia and
ﬁscal policy behavior is an important line of theoretical work.
We consider a closed economy in which the government ﬁnances an exogenous level
of purchases and counter-cyclical lump-sum transfers to households by collecting distorting
taxes and issuing non-state-contingent bonds. However, the bond contract is not enforceable.
The maximum level of debt that the government is able and willing to service, which we will
call ﬁscal limit, is constrained by dynamic Laﬀer Curves and political willingness. Dynamic
Laﬀer Curves, endogenously arising from distorting taxes, constrain the government’s ability
to service its debt. If the tax rate is on the slippery side of Laﬀer Curve, then the government
would be unable to raise more tax revenue through a higher tax rate. Even if the government
is able to raise tax revenue, it may not be willing to do so. We treat the willingness as a
political decision unrelated to economic fundamentals.
The ﬁscal limit is stochastic. At each period, an eﬀective ﬁscal limit is drawn from
the distribution. If the level of government debt surpasses the eﬀective ﬁscal limit, then
the government reneges on a fraction of its debt. Households are assumed to know the
distribution of the ﬁscal limit. Using this information, they can decide the quantity of
government bonds that they are willing to hold and the price at which they are willing to
purchase the bonds.
First, we ﬁnd that the distribution of ﬁscal limits is country-speciﬁc and depends on the
2underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. An economy that is less vulnerable to exogenous
shocks may allow the government to raise tax revenue without moving into the slippery
side of the Laﬀer Curve. A government with a heavy burden of lump-sum transfers or
government purchases has a higher probability of reaching the peak of the Laﬀer Curve
and may face a signiﬁcantly lower ﬁscal limit. Strong counter-cyclical transfers, which arise
from large automatic stabilizers or discretionary counter-cyclical ﬁscal policies, can lead to
a more dispersed distribution of ﬁscal limits, as they deteriorate government budgets when
tax revenue is low. In addition, the distribution also hinges on political willingness to service
debt. Higher political risk may reduce the ﬁscal limit. We calibrate the model to three
groups of countries, Canada and New Zealand, Belgium and Italy, and Japan and Sweden,
and ﬁnd that the predicted distributions of ﬁscal limits are consistent with the observed
sovereign downgrades in these countries, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Second, the default risk premium, reﬂecting the probability of sovereign default, is a
nonlinear function of the level of the government’s debt. The risk premium begins to emerge
as the level of the debt approaches the lower end of the distribution of the ﬁscal limit.
The nonlinearity between the sovereign risk premia and government indebtedness is widely
identiﬁed in empirical literature, (see Alesina et al. (1992), Bernoth et al. (2006) and among
many others). We also ﬁnd that the default risk premia of the long-term bonds jump ahead
of the short-term bonds and provide early warnings of sovereign defaults. Under a plausible
calibration to the economy of Greece, the model predicts sovereign risk premia comparable
to those observed in the data.
This paper is closely related to Uribe (2006). In a closed economy model with nomi-
nal debt and an exogenous tax policy, Uribe (2006) shows that default is inevitable if the
monetary authority follows price-level targeting, as both monetary and ﬁscal policy are ‘ac-
tive’ in the sense of Leeper (1991). He solves the model analytically by assuming that the
government has to default when the tax-to-debt ratio falls below some ﬁxed and exogenous
threshold. Using a real economy model, Juessen et al. (2009) endogenize the defaulting
threshold by introducing the Laﬀer Curve and assuming that investors may stop lending
whenever the government runs into a Ponzi scheme. However, the tax policy is assumed to
be exogenous in order to endogenize the defaulting threshold. After solving the model using
a second-order approximation, they show that under plausible calibrations, the predicted
sovereign risk premia fall far short of those observed in the data.
We contribute to the literature in three dimensions. First, we allow for an endogenous
ﬁscal limit. The eﬀective ﬁscal limit is a random draw from the distribution of ﬁscal limits,
which endogenously arise from the dynamic Laﬀer Curves. The predicted distributions of
ﬁscal limits for diﬀerent countries are consistent with sovereign downgrades in the OECD
3countries. Second, we allow for an endogenous tax policy, which allows the government
to raise the tax rate when government debt rises and, therefore, to aﬀect the outcome of
sovereign default. Otherwise, the sovereign default only depends on exogenous shocks or
parameters. Third, we solve the full nonlinear model using the Monotone Mapping method.
The nonlinear solution is important since the ﬁscal limit can be far from the steady state.
A large amount of theoretical literature exists that considers sovereign default in emerging
market economies. Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008), this literature
uses a small open economy model and assumes that the government, being a benevolent
social planner, makes an optimal and strategic decision of sovereign default. In this paper,
we do not model the sovereign default as a strategic decision as we try to understand the
diﬀerent sovereign risk premia across developed countries where sovereign defaults have rarely
occurred in the post-war period.
2 Infinite-horizon Model
In this section, we lay out an inﬁnite-horizon model in which ﬁscal limits, which measure the
government’s ability and willingness to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic
Laﬀer Curves. Consider a closed economy with linear production technology. The aggregate
resource constraint is,
ct + gt = At(1   Lt) (1)















Government: The government ﬁnances lump-sum transfers to households (zt) and exoge-
nous and unproductive purchases (gt) by collecting tax revenue and issuing one-period bonds
(bt). Tax revenue is raised through a time-varying tax rate (τt) on labor income.
τtAt(1   Lt) + btqt = (1   ∆t)bt 1       
bd
t
+gt + zt (3)
qt is the price of the bond in units of time t consumption. For each unit of bond, the
government promises to pay the household one unit of consumption in the next period.
However, the bond contract is not enforceable. At time t, the government may partially
default on its liability (bt 1) by a fraction of ∆t. The post-default government liability is
denoted as bd
t. The default scheme depends on the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, which
arises endogenously from dynamic Laﬀer Curves. Section 2.1 provides a further discussion
4of the ﬁscal limit and the default scheme.
We assume that the government follows a simple tax rule. It is an abstraction designed
to capture the tax policy as ﬁscal authorities tend to increase the tax rate when government
debt rises. We refer to the parameter of γ as the “tax adjustment parameter” (γ > 0). A
larger γ means that the government is more willing to retire debt by raising the tax rate.







In addition, we assume that lump-sum transfers are countercyclical. This assumption
follows from the estimation that the elasticity of real detrended transfers with respect to
detrended productivity (ζz) is negative for all of the OECD countries, varying from -0.093 to
-2.22. On the other hand, the estimated elasticity of real government purchases with respect
to productivity isn’t conclusive, varying from +2.5 to -2.5 across the OECD countries. In




















t et  N(0,σ
2
e). (6)
Household: With access to the sovereign bond market, a representative household chooses






s.t. At(1   τt)(1   Lt) + zt   ct = btqt   (1   ∆t)bt 1 (8)
with prices and policies, fτt,zt,qt,∆tg, taken as given. Et is the mathematical expectation
that is conditional on the information available at time t, including the sovereign default
information. β is the discount factor, while u(c,L) is strictly increasing in terms of household
consumption and leisure.
The household’s ﬁrst-order condition requires that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure equates to the after-tax wage. The government bond price
in Equation 10 reﬂects the household’s expectation about the probability and magnitude of
5sovereign default in the next period.
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Qt+j+1 is the stochastic discounted factor from time t to time t + j + 1.
2.1 Fiscal Limit and Laffer Curve The proportional tax on labor income distorts a
household’s behavior as it lowers the after-tax wage and may induce household to work less.
An increase in the tax rate on labor income may or may not raise tax revenue depending on
the existing tax rate. In general, higher rates raise revenue when the existing tax rate is low
and reduce revenue when the existing rate is high, which is the basis for the Laﬀer Curve.
Laﬀer Curves are usually dynamic in the sense that the shape of the Laﬀer Curve depends
on the state of the economy, i.e, the productivity level (At) and government purchases (gt)
in our model.1
For a given state, a tax rate exists at that higher rates do not raise more revenue. This
point is the peak of the dynamic Laﬀer Curve, denoted as τmax(A,g). At this point, the
government can raise the maximum level of ﬁscal surplus, because the government purchases
are an exogenous state and the lump-sum transfers are countercylical. The ceiling of the
ﬁscal surplus constrains the maximum level of debt that the government is able to pay back.
Mathematically, it is the expected sum of the discounted maximum ﬁscal surplus in all future
periods.2
However, the government may not be willing to tax the labor income at the peak of Laﬀer
Curve in practice depending on complicated political considerations. Poor’s (2008) states
that “the stability, predictability, and transparency of a country’s political institutions are
important considerations in analyzing the parameters for economic policymaking.”
Without resorting to a structure political economy model, we introduce a political risk
1Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) use a neoclassical model to compute Laﬀer Curves for the United States and
15 European countries.
2Cochrane (2010) emphasizes the ﬁscal limit to monetary policy in the discussion of monetary and ﬁscal
policy in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-2009.
6parameter (θ) into the model. Higher political risk (a lower θ), as a result of a lack of political
consensus or a turnover of power across political parties with diﬀerent ideologies, implies a
lower probability for the government to raise ﬁscal surplus at the maximum level. We assume
that the maximum ﬁscal surplus that the government is willing to raise is proportional to
the value of θ. For a given state of the economy (At,gt), the maximum primary ﬁscal surplus
that government is willing to raise (smax





t   gt   zt) 0  θ  1. (12)
Equation 12 implies that the government simply rolls over its debt and the primary ﬁscal
surplus is zero if the political risk is extremely high and θ is zero. On the other hand, the
government is willing to raise the maximum ﬁscal surplus if the political risk is extremely
low and θ is one.
To this end, we can deﬁne the ﬁscal limit as the maximum level of debt that the govern-
ment is able and willing to service. If the political risk is time-varying, then the ﬁscal limit









t   gt   zt) (13)
Qmax and T max represent the discounted rate and total tax revenue when the tax rate is
at the peak of Laﬀer Curve τmax. Appendix A describes how to generate the distribution
of the ﬁscal limit through a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. The distribution is
approximated to N(b,σ2
b).
2.2 Default Scheme The default scheme depends on the realization of the eﬀective
ﬁscal limit (b
t), which is a random draw from the distribution of ﬁscal limit. If the debt
surpasses the eﬀective ﬁscal limit, then the government partially defaults. The assumption
of a partial default and random draws from the distribution is an abstraction from debt
renegotiation. Looking at comprehensive historical data, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) show
that creditors can often get a signiﬁcant share of what they are owed after contentious debt
negotiations.








b if bt 1  b
t
The larger the standard deviation (σb), the higher the default rate becomes. A more dispersed
7distribution of the ﬁscal limit implies a higher uncertainty of the government’s ability and
willingness to service its debt. If the government debt equals the mean of the distribution b,
then the government would default enough to bring the debt level below the lower boundary
of the ﬁscal limit, deﬁned as two standard deviations below the mean (b   2σb), and,
therefore, the probability of sequential defaults would be low. This assumption is meant to
capture the fact that defaults in sequential periods are not frequently observed.
2.3 Fiscal Limit and Transversality Condition It is important to emphasize that
the ﬁscal limit, deﬁned in Equation (13), is independent of the equilibrium conditions of the
model. Given the structural parameters of the model and the speciﬁcation of the shock
processes, the unique mapping between τmax and the state of the economy (A,g) determines
the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, regardless of the equilibrium conditions of the model.
A natural question that one may ask is, “Why not to deﬁne sovereign default as the
consequence that occurs if the government becomes unable to avoid a Ponzi scheme?” If
we follow this approach, then either the government never defaults in equilibrium, or no
equilibrium exists, because the time-varying tax rate endogenously depends upon the level of
government debt as speciﬁed in Equation (4). If the tax adjustment parameter is suﬃciently
large, then the government never defaults. However, if the tax adjustment parameter is too
small, then no equilibrium exists.
In related literature, Uribe (2006) applies simple closing rules in the sense that the
government defaults when the current tax-to-debt ratio exceeds a ﬁxed and exogenous ratio.
Juessen et al. (2009) assume that the tax rate is constant and, therefore, government default
can occur in equilibrium.
3 Distribution of Fiscal Limit
The distribution of the ﬁscal limit is country-speciﬁc and depends on the underlying pa-
rameters, for instance, of political uncertainty, counter-cyclicality of lump-sum transfers, the
government size and shock processes, as shown in Equation 13. In Section 3.2, we calibrate
the model to a ‘typical’ OECD country in the sense that all of the parameters are set to
the average of the OECD data. Then we change one parameter at a time and compare the
distributions in order to understand how each parameter aﬀects the distribution. In Section
3.3 we move a step further by calibrating the simple model to six diﬀerent countries in three
groups, Canada and New Zealand, Belgium and Italy, and Japan and Sweden. We compare
the predicted distributions of ﬁscal limits in order to discover whether they are consistent
with the observed sovereign downgrades.
83.1 Benchmark Calibration The model is calibrated at an annual frequency. The
household discount rate is 0.95 and the net interest rate is 5.26%. The utility function is
assumed to be u(c,L) = logc + ϕlogL. The leisure preference parameter (ϕ) is calibrated
in such a way that the household spends 25% of time working and the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply is 3. The total amount of time and the productivity level at the steady state
are normalized to 1.
Other parameters may vary across diﬀerent experiments. Following Arteta and Galina
(2008), we use the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) index of political risk to
calibrate the parameter of θ. The ICRG index at the scale of 0 to 100 has been available
since 1984. The higher the ICRG index, the lower the political risk. We calibrate θ to ICRG
index scaled by 100.
All of the ﬁscal variables are calibrated to the data for the period between 1971 and 2007
from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 84 (2009). The average tax rate is deﬁned as the
ratio of the total tax revenue over the GDP, including social security, indirect and direct
taxes. The total government purchases include government consumption of ﬁxed capital and
government ﬁnal consumption of expenditures. Lump-sum transfers are deﬁned as the sum
of the social security payments, net capital transfers and subsidies. The shock process of
productivity is estimated using the detrended data of the real GDP per worker.3 In addition,
the elasticity of lump-sum transfers with respect to productivity (ζz) is estimated through
linear regression of the detrended real lump-sum transfers over the detrended real GDP per
worker.
We simulate the distributions of ﬁscal limits using Markov Chain Monte Carlo method,
following the steps in Appendix A.
3.2 General Comparison In the benchmark case, we calibrate the simple model to
a ‘typical’ OECD country. Taken the government purchase-GDP ratio for instance. We
calculate the overall average ratio of government purchase over GDP during the period of
1971 to 2007 and across all countries. In the benchmark calibration, g/y is set to this overall
average ratio.
In the same period, the average lump-sum transfers are 15.7% of the GDP, the average
government purchases are 21.3% of the GDP, and the average tax rate is 0.362. The average
estimation of ζz is -0.947, implying that a decrease of productivity by 10% raises the lump-
sum transfers by 9.47%. Using a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ﬁlter, both the productivity
and the government purchase shocks have an average persistence of 0.553 and an average
standard deviation of 0.02. The ICRG index of political risk stays fairly stable across time
3The data of real GDP per worker is from Penn World Table Version 6.2, see Heston et al. (2006).
9for most of the OECD countries and, therefore, we let θt ﬁxed across time and calibrate
according to the average ICRG index, which is 83.
We then change one parameter at a time in order to understand how the diﬀerent pa-
rameters aﬀect the distribution of ﬁscal limits.
Government Size: The highest average share of government purchases over the GDP
is 29% in Sweden and the lowest average share is 13.7% in Switzerland. The average is
21.3% across all of the OECD countries. In the top left panel of Figure 3, we keep all of
the other variables the same as in the benchmark case, but vary the share of government
purchases over the GDP from 29% to 21.3% and 13.7%. The variance of the distribution
doesn’t change much, but the mean rises dramatically from 30% of the GDP to 235% of the
GDP. This increase is due to higher government purchases, which can reduce the maximum
feasible ﬁscal surplus at each period and signiﬁcantly lower the ﬁscal limit. Similar dramatic
changes are observed in the top right panel of Figure 3, as the lump-sum transfers change
from 22.4% of the GDP (Austria) to 15.7% (the benchmark case) and 8.4% (Australia).
Countercyclical Lump-sum Transfers: In the left panel of the second row, we let ζz
change from -2.22 (Sweden) to -0.947 (the benchmark case) and -0.093 (Austria), while
keeping the other parameters at the overall average across the countries. The mean of the
distribution doesn’t change, but the standard deviation is almost double from 0.0076 to
0.017. Strong countercyclical ﬁscal transfers, arising from a large automatic stabilizer or
discretionary countercyclical policy, can aggravate the volatility of the ﬁscal limit. In a bad
state with lower productivity, the government transfers more resources to households and
the budget is further deteriorated.
Political Risk: In the right panel of the second row, when θ decreases from 0.96 (Nether-
land) to 0.83 (the benchmark case) and 0.59 (Greece), the mean of the distribution decreases
from 151% of the GDP to 130% and 93%.4 A lower political risk (a higher θ) indicates that
the government is more willing to service its debt.
Shock Process: In the third row of Figure 3, we compare distributions when the persis-
tence and standard deviation of the productivity shock change. The shock persistence varies
from 0.747 (Spain) to 0.553 (the benchmark case) and 0.342 (Italy) in the left panel, while
the standard deviation changes from 0.034 (New Zealand) to 0.02 (the benchmark case) and
4The ICRG index of political risk is quite stable over time for OECD countries. The highest index in the
sample is from Netherland in 2001, and the lowest is from Greece in 1986.
100.014 (France) in the right panel. The standard deviation of the distribution is reduced from
0.019 to 0.008 in both comparisons. The economy may face a dispersed distribution of ﬁscal
limits if the productivity shock is more persistent or volatile.
The shock persistence varies from 0.726 (Canada) to 0.553 (the benchmark case) and
0.2 (Denmark) in the left panel of the bottom row, while the standard deviation changes
from 0.0288 (Ireland) to 0.02 (the benchmark case) and 0.0147 (France) in the right panel.
However, the distribution of ﬁscal limits does not drastically change. This conclusion is
model-speciﬁc. Due to the logarithmic utility function of leisure, the wealth and substitution
eﬀects from a change of government purchases are almost canceled out.
3.3 Country Analysis In this section, we calibrate our model to three groups of
countries, Canada and New Zealand, Belgium and Italy, and Japan and Sweden, so that we
can compare the predicted distributions of ﬁscal limits to the observed sovereign downgrades.
3.3.1 Canada vs. New Zealand Canada and New Zealand are very similar in terms of
average tax rates (32.4% in Canada and 31% in New Zealand), average government spending
shares (23% of the GDP in Canada and 20.5% in New Zealand) and average transfer shares
(12% of the GDP in Canada and 13.4% in New Zealand). The estimated elasticities of
lump-sum transfers with respect to productivity are also comparable for the two countries
(-1.25 for Canada and -0.82 for New Zealand). The average ICRG indexes of political risk
are almost identical (84.1 in Canada and 85.3 in New Zealand).
However, the two countries have been treated diﬀerently by the rating agencies, as il-
lustrated in the top row of Figure 2. From 1983 to 1992, the debt rating of New Zealand
government was reduced by three notches from AAA to AA- as its gross debt climbed from
58% to 75% of the GDP. The Canadian government, on the other hand, was able to keep
its AAA rating until its gross debt hit 91% of the GDP in 1992. The rating was reduced by
one notch to AA+ and then stayed at this level until 2001.
An important reason for this discrepancy is that the economy of New Zealand is less
diversiﬁed than Canada. For instance, Standard & Poor’s sees New Zealand economy’s
structure as relatively narrowly-based and heavily reliant on agriculture as it reports that
agriculture accounted for close to 7% of New Zealand’s GDP and 58% of its export receipts.
This type of economic structure makes New Zealand particularly vulnerable to international
commodity price ﬂuctuations and global economic slowdowns. During the period between
1970 and 2007, the standard deviation of the detrended real GDP per worker in New Zealand
is about twice as large as that of Canada.
We simulate the distributions of ﬁscal limits for both countries following Equation 13. In
order to illustrate the impact of the variance of the productivity shock upon the distribution,
11we keep all the other parameters the same for two countries. The average tax rate is set
to 0.32, average government spending-GDP ratio to 0.21, average transfer-GDP ratio to
0.13, average political uncertainty to 0.85 and the elasticity of transfers with respect to
productivity to -1.25. The standard deviation of the productivity shock is estimated to be
0.04 in New Zealand and 0.02 in Canada, while the persistence is estimated to 0.6 for both
countries. Since the shock process of the government purchases does not have much of an
impact on distribution, we let it be constant.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows that the distribution of the ﬁscal limit is much more
dispersed in New Zealand than in Canada. Given the same level of government debt, a
less diversiﬁed economy is more vulnerable to exogenous shocks and may face tighter ﬁscal
restrictions.
3.3.2 Belgium vs. Italy Both Italy and Belgium accumulated massive public debt in
the 1990s, well above 100% of the GDP, as shown in the middle row of Figure 2. However,
only the Italian government received persistent downgrades, while Belgium’s rating has been
stable. One possible explanation is that Belgium demonstrated strong political willingness
to be ﬁscal responsible. It made great strides in reforming the welfare program and reducing
lump-sum transfers by about 10% of the GDP since 1980. On the contrary, a high level of
public debt has been sustained in Italy since 1980 in spite of ﬁscal consolidation attempts
that have occurred periodically in the country since the early 1990s.
The two countries are very similar in regard to average transfer shares (18.8% of the GDP
in Belgium and 17.8% of the GDP in Italy) and the estimated elasticity of transfers with
respect to productivity (-0.63 in Belgium and -0.73 in Italy). The processes of productivity
shocks feature similar standard deviations (0.018 in Belgium and 0.017 in Italy) and fairly
comparable persistence (0.31 in Belgium and 0.53 in Italy). They are also fairly comparable
in terms of average tax rates (0.43% in Belgium and 0.36% in Italy) and average government
spending shares (23.8% of the GDP in Belgium and 20% of the GDP in Italy). However, the
average ICRG index of political risk is lower in Italy than in Belgium (around 70 in Italy
and 80 in Belgium) during the period between 1988 and 1995 when the Italian government
bond was downgraded.
In the simulation, the average tax rate is set to 0.4, average government spending-GDP
ratio to 0.225, average transfer-GDP ratio to 0.18 and the elasticity of transfers with respect
to productivity to -0.7. The standard deviation of the productivity shock is set to 0.018 and
the persistence to 0.5. The shock process of government purchases is almost identical in the
two countries with a standard deviation of 0.025 and persistence of 0.68. The parameter of
political risk, nevertheless, is calibrated at 0.7 in Italy and 0.8 in Belgium.
12The middle panel of Figure 4 shows that the mean of the distribution of ﬁscal limit is
lower in Italy than in Belgium. A lack of political will to act on the deterioration of public
ﬁnances raises political uncertainty and is often an important factor in sovereign downgrades.
3.3.3 Japan vs. Sweden The comparison of Japan and Sweden sheds some light on
how the size of a government and counter-cyclical transfers aﬀect the distribution of the
ﬁscal limit. The two countries are similar in terms of political risk, with an average ICRG
index of 84 in Japan and 86 in Sweden. The estimated processes of productivity shocks are
comparable. The persistence is 0.56 in Japan and 0.66 in Sweden, and the standard deviation
is 0.018 in Japan and 0.015 in Sweden. However, the two countries are very diﬀerent in terms
of average tax rates (26% in Japan and 49% in Sweden), average government spending shares
(16.2% of the GDP in Japan and 29% in Sweden), average transfer shares (10% of the GDP in
Japan and 19.5% in Sweden) and the elasticities of the transfers with respect to productivity
(-1.15 in Japan and -2.22 in Sweden).
We simulate the distribution of ﬁscal limits by setting the average political parameter
to 0.86, the persistence of productivity shock to 0.6 and the standard deviation to 0.018.
All of the ﬁscal variables are calibrated to match the data. The bottom panel of Figure 4
illustrates that a large ﬁscal transfer program generates small ﬁscal margins for maneuver
and places a short leash on the level of government debt.
4 Sovereign Risk Premia: Nonlinear Solution
In this section, we calibrate the model to the economy of Greece and then solve the non-
linear model. Due to the existence of a ﬁscal limit, the model can not be solved through
linearization. Instead, we resort to the Monotone Mapping method in order to solve the
model nonlinearly.
4.1 Method The solution method, based on Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004), con-
jectures candidate decision rules that reduce the system to a set of expectation ﬁrst-order






, into the value of government debt (bt).5 The mapping is denoted as
bt = fb(ψt).
The complete model consists of a system of nonlinear equations including the ﬁrst-order
conditions from the household’s maximization problem, Equations 9 and 10; the government
budget constraint, Equation 3; the speciﬁcations of the policy process, Equations 4; the
5Note the state variable bd
t = (1 ∆t)bt 1 incorporates 2-dimension information: the eﬀective ﬁscal limit
at time t, b
t, and the pre-default government liability, bt 1.
13aggregate resource constraint, Equation 1; the speciﬁcations of shock processes, Equation 2
and 6; the transversality condition, Equation 11; and the speciﬁcation of the default scheme,
Equation 12.
After substituting into the conjectured rule, the core equation of the model is,
bd
















The expectation in the right-hand side is evaluated using a numerical quadrature. Equation
14 is solved for each set of state variables deﬁned over a discrete partition of the state space.
The decision rule (fb(ψ)) is updated at every node in the state space. The procedure is
repeated until the iterations update the current decision rule by less than some ϵ > 0 (set to
1e   8).
After ﬁnding the decision rule for government bonds (fb(ψ)) I can solve the pricing rule
(q = fq(ψ)) using the government budget constraint, Equation 3. The interest rate on
government bonds can also be solved using Rt = 1
qt, denoted as fR(ψ).
4.2 Calibration to the Economy of Greece The ﬁscal parameters are calibrated
in order to match the Greek data from 1971 to 2007. At the steady state, the government
purchases are set to 16.7% of the GDP, the lump-sum transfers to 13.34% of the GDP, and
the government debt to 40% of the GDP.6 The resulting tax rate is 0.32 at the steady state,
which is slightly higher than the average tax rate of 0.28. The estimated elasticity of real
detrended lump-sum transfers with respect to real GDP per worker (ζz) is -0.45. The tax
adjustment parameter γ is estimated at 0.42.7
The ICRG index of political risk for Greece represents a regime-switching process. It
stayed low and stable during the period between 1984 and 1993, rose from the level of around
60 to 80 between 1994 and 1996, and stayed around the high level until the ﬁnancial crisis
erupted in 2008. The regime switching in the middle 1990s was related to the establishment
of the European Union, while the recent switching is related to the political uncertainty of
the European Union bail-out plan in the wake of ﬁnancial crisis. In this model, we calibrate
θt as a two-state symmetric Markov regime switching process. The low state θL is calibrated
to 0.61, the average ICRG index of political risk from 1984 to 1993 scaled by 100, and the
6The data of government debt is from European Commission (2009).
7 is estimated through linear regression of the tax rate over government debt-GDP ratio during the
period of 1971 to 1995, because the debt-GDP ratio for Greece governemnt is almost ﬂat from 1995 to 2007.
14high state θH is 0.78, the average ICRG index from 1994 to 2007 scaled by 100. We assume
that the probability of a switch between the two states is 1/13, as Greece enjoyed a stable
and high ICRG index within 13 years from 1994 to 2007.
Using HP ﬁlter, the productivity shock has a persistence of 0.45 and standard deviation
of 0.0328, while the government purchase shock has a persistence of 0.426 and standard
deviation of 0.0294. All of the other parameters are calibrated in the same way as the
benchmark calibration in Section 3.1.
We simulate the distribution of the ﬁscal limit according to the above calibrations. Figure
5 shows that the distribution is more dispersed if the political risk is a Markov-regime
switching process than if ﬁxed at either low or high level. We focus on the Markov-regime
switching case. The mean of the distribution (b) is 0.4251, around 170% of the GDP, and
the standard deviation (σb) is 0.0267. Following the default scheme in Section 2.2, the default
rate (δ) is 0.1256.
4.3 Decision Rule The pricing rule of the government bond interest rate maps a 3-
dimension state space to a 1-dimension state space, Rt = fR(bd
t,At,gt). The rule is a
4-dimension surface in a single graph. For simplicity, we have plotted slices of the surface
by ﬁxing two variables at a time.
By keeping the government purchases (gt) at the steady state, the top panel of Figure
6 compares the response of net interest rate to the current government liability bd
t under
diﬀerent values of productivity (At). The two green vertical lines, labeled b and b
2std, are
the mean of the ﬁscal limit and the threshold that is lower than the mean by two standard
deviations (b
2std = b   2σb), respectively. The dashed red, solid blue, and dashed-dotted
black line represent the responses in interest rate when the level of productivity is respectively
two standard deviations lower than the steady state (Low A), at steady state, and two
standard deviations higher than the steady state (High A). Two ﬁndings follow from the
comparison. First, the net interest rate rises with government liability in a nonlinear way. In
all three cases the interest rate rises sharply as government liability enters the lower end of
the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, i.e. bd
t is larger than b
2std. The ﬁnancial market starts to
demand a premium for the government bond as the probability of sovereign default begins
to emerge from nil. Second, the level of productivity has a substantial impact on default risk
premia. For a given level of current government liability, the lower the level of productivity,
the higher the interest rate, i.e. the dashed red line lies above the dashed-dotted black line.
In a recession, tax revenue is slashed and the government has to issue more debt in order
to ﬁnance its expenditures. A higher debt level can substantially raise the sovereign default
probability and risk premium of the government bond.
15The bottom panel of Figure 6 compares the responses of the interest rate to the current
government liability under diﬀerent levels of government purchases (gt) while keeping the
level of productivity (At) at the steady state. Again, the interest rate rises sharply as
government liability enters the lower end of the distribution of the ﬁscal limit. However,
diﬀerent government purchases do not have much of an impact on the interest rates as the
dashed, solid and dashed-dotted lines are very close. Government purchases aﬀect the level
of government debt in two opposite directions. Higher expenditures drive up government
liability, while crowding out private consumption. Thereofre, the household may work more
due to an income eﬀect. A higher output raises tax revenues and helps to ﬁnance government
purchases. Overall, diﬀerent government purchases do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the
interest rate due to the logarithmic utility function.
4.4 Nonlinear Simulation Figure (7) illustrates the nonlinear simulation in which we
draw a sequence of positive government spending shocks and negative productivity shocks.
At the period t = 1, the government debt is set to 125% of the GDP, similar to the debt level
that the Greek government accumulates by 2009. In the following ﬁve periods, the economy
receives shocks from government purchases and the level of productivity. The simulated
paths of productivity and government purchases over the GDP ratio, summarized in Table
4.4, are meant to capture the countercyclical ﬁscal policies in a severe economic downturn.
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t= 6
Productivity -4.88% -8.61% -9.97% -6.67% -4.21% -1.92%
Government Spending-GDP 20.35% 21.68% 21.81% 21.08% 20.29% 19.52%
As shown in Figure 7, the household works less and consumes less when the productivity
is low. The lower tax revenue, as a result of a lower labor supply and productivity, and
higher government purchases push up the government’s borrowing. Interest rates rise partly
because households substitute away from future consumption and partly because government
liability approaches the eﬀective ﬁscal limit (the green line b
t) which is randomly drawn from
the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, N(b,σ2
b). The government budget is further deteriorated
through rising interest payments.
In order to disentangle the eﬀect of the intertemporal substitution from the risk premium
in the rising interest rate, Figure 7 compares the default model with a default-free economy
in which the sovereign bond is not constrained by the ﬁscal limit and δ is zero.8 The solid
black lines represent the default model, while the dashed blue lines represent the default-
free economy under the same sequences of shocks. The risk premium of a one-period bond,
8The default-free case can be interpreted as the economy with access to lump-sum taxes.
16deﬁned as the interest rate diﬀerence between the two economies, is around 80 basis points
for a prolonged period.
4.5 Long-term Bond In practice, the interest rate spreads of long-term bonds, rather
than short-term bonds, are used to measure sovereign default risk premia. An n-period bond











The multiple-period expectation is calculated using MCMC simulation. We use a ﬁnite-
element method to approximate the decision rules of a one-period bond.
Conditional on the same shocks as in Figure 7, Figure 8 illustrates that the premia of the
long-term bonds jump ahead of the short-term bond and provide early warnings of sovereign
defaults. Expected high government indebtedness in the future results in a rise in current
risk premia of long-term bonds, even the risk premia of short-term bonds are ﬂat. The longer
the bond maturity, the earlier the default risk premia begin to emerge.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a general equilibrium framework in which an endogenous and stochas-
tic ﬁscal limit measures the government’s ability and willingness to service its debt. The
ﬁscal limit is constrained by the dynamic Laﬀer Curves, implied by distorting taxes, and,
also, depends on political willingness. The distribution of ﬁscal limits depends on the un-
derlying economic fundamentals, for instance, the size of the government, the degree of the
countercyclical ﬁscal policy, economic diversity and political uncertainty. Calibrated to dif-
ferent countries, the model predicts distributions of ﬁscal limits consistent with the observed
sovereign ratings in OECD countries.
Due to the existence of ﬁscal limits, the model produces a nonlinear relationship between
the default risk premia and the level of government debt. The risk premia start to emerge as
the level of debt approaches the ﬁscal limit. In addition, long-term bonds give early warnings
of sovereign defaults. The longer the bond maturity, the earlier the default risk premium
emerges.
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19A Simulation of Fiscal Limit
In this model, household consumption and labor supply only depend on the income tax
rate and the exogenous state variables (A,g). Assume the utility function is u(c,L) =
logc + ϕlogL. Household ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as,
1   Lt =
At(1   τt) + ϕgt
At(1 + ϕ   τt)
(16)
ct =
(At   gt)(1   τt)
1 + ϕ   τt
(17)
The tax revenue (Tt) is,
Tt = τt
At(1   τt) + ϕgt
1 + ϕ   τt
= (1 + 2ϕ)At   ϕgt  
(
At(1 + ϕ   τt) +
(1 + ϕ)ϕ(At   gt)
1 + ϕ   τt
)
(18)
The tax revenue reaches to the maximum level (T max
t ) if the tax rate reaches the peak point




t = 1 + ϕ  
√





t = (1 + 2ϕ)At   ϕgt   2
√
(1 + ϕ)ϕAt(At   gt) (20)
Since there exists a unique mapping between the exogenous state space (A,g) to τmax and
T max, the ﬁscal limit (B
0) can be obtained using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation and
be approximated as a normal distribution. We draw 300 realizations of the productivity and
government purchase shocks and compute the paths for all the variables in the model under
the assumption that the tax rate is at the peak of the Laﬀer Curve. We discard the ﬁrst 200
draws as a burn-in period and compute the discounted sum of future surpluses, according to




































































Figure 1: Sovereign downgrades in OECD countries from 1975 to 2010 (Standard & Poor’s
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Figure 2: Comparison of sovereign downgrades (dashed blue line, measured to the left axis)
and government debt-GDP ratio (solid green line, measured to the right axis) in selected
countries during the period of 1975 to 2010.





















































































































Figure 3: Comparison of the distribution of ﬁscal limits as one parameter changes in each
panel. The middle distribution in each panel is under the benchmark calibration.





























Figure 4: Comparison of the distribution of ﬁscal limits in diﬀerent country groups: top
panel (New Zealand vs. Canada); middle panel (Italy vs. Belgium); bottom panel (Sweden
vs. Japan).















Figure 5: Simulated distribution of ﬁscal limit in Greece













































































Figure 6: Pricing rule of net interest rater(b) = (R(b)   1)  100: top panel compares the
pricing rule at a high, steady-state, and low level of A while g is at steady state; bottom
panel compares the rule at a high, steady-state, and low level of g while A is at steady state.


















































































Figure 7: Nonlinear simulation to negative productivity shocks combined with positive gov-
ernment purchase shocks: stochastic default case (solid black line) vs. default-free case
(dashed blue line).

















Figure 8: Risk premia of long-term bond with diﬀerent maturities conditional on the shock
paths in Figure 7.
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